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PRIVATE ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1957*
A RECENT attempt by the federal government to enjoin private economic re-
taliation against Negroes who registered to vote in Haywood County, Tennes-
see,' raises questions concerning the scope and effectiveness of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.2 The Supreme Court has long considered voting "a right secured
by the Constitution" against racially inspired deprivations. 3 But prior to the
enactment of the 1957 statute there was no effective means by which the
rights of Negroes to register and vote in federal elections could be enforced.
Between 1866 and 1875, Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate "the
times, places, and manner of holding [federal] elections" 4 and to enforce the
15th Amendment's proscription against state abridgment of voting rights on
racial grounds,' enacted a number of statutes directed at the protection of
Negro voting rights.6 These statutes declared, inter alia,7 that no citizen
*United States v. Beaty, 288 F2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
1. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
2. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b) & (c) (1958).
3. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). See also Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651, 657, 661 (1884); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900); Swafford v.
Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
Although the Constitution deals in many places with voting, it is quite oblique about
granting the right to vote in federal elections. Article I, § 2 and Amendment XVIII,
§ 1, dealing respectively with the election of Representatives and Senators, leave the
determination of voter qualifications to the States. The equal protection clause of the XIV
Amendment protects voters from state interference with the equality of opportunity to vote
in any election. Amendment XV protects citizens from being denied the right to vote by
any State because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2 of Amend-
ment XIV, however, seems to assume the existence of a "right to vote." Article I, § 4 gives
to the Congress the ultimate say in determining the times, places and manner of holding
Congressional elections. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) ; United States v. Gale,
109 U.S. 65 (1883) ; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879). Amendment XIX forbids denial
of the right to vote because of sex.
4. Article I, § 4 gives Congress the power to protect the federal elections from inter-
ference by private persons and states. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) ; In re Coy,
127 U.S. 731 (1888) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165
F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd
sub nomi. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960) ; United States v. Association of
Citizens Councils of Louisiana, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1960).
5. Amendents XIV and XV have been held to require state action and neither amend-
ment reaches the conduct of private persons acting in a wholly private capacity. Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Private
persons, however, may be considered as acting under color of state authority when they are
acting in concert with the state. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
6. See REPORT OF PRESMENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS
104-06 (1947) [hereinafter cited as To SECURE THESE RIGHTS]; UNITED STATES CoM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 CMvIL RIGHTS REPORT 73-75 [hereinafter cited as Crvn
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could be denied the right to vote in any election because of race and made
any attempt at such denial a misdemeanor, subject to private injunctive and
compensatory relief."
The courts, in a series of decisions between 1873 and 1903, circumscribed
these statutes 9 by limiting their application to federal elections, 10 by declaring
some of the remedies unconstitutional," by construing the statutes to proscribe
only those acts which were committed under color of law,'12 by requiring the
exhaustion of state administrative remedies as a precondition to the invocation
of the federal statute,13 and by denying disenfranchised Negroes the privilege
of suing as a class.' 4
RIGHTS REPORT] ; KONVITz, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 41-101 (1961) ; CARR, FEDERAL
PROTECTION OF CivI. RIGHTS (1947).
7. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1987, 1989-92 (1958); 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1958); 16 Stat. 140 (1870), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 1989-91 (1958);
16 Stat. 433 (1871) ; 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1958) ; ch. 114, 18
Stat. 335 (1875).
8. 16 Stat. 140, § 1 declared the right to vote. Of the remedy sections, § 5 is of particu-
lar interest. It provided:
That if any person shall prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate, or shall attempt to
prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate, any person from exercising or in exercising the
right to suffrage, to whom the right of suffrage is secured or guaranteed by the fif-
teenth amendment... by means of... depriving such person of employment or occu-
pation, or of ejecting such person from rented house, lands, or other property, or by
threats of refusing to renew leases or contracts for labor ... such person ... shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... (Emphasis added.)
Section 5 was subsequently held unconstitutional by James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903)
on the theory "that a statute which purports to punish purely individual action cannot be
sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment
upon Congress to prevent action by the State. . . ." Id. at 139. It was subsequently repealed by
35 Stat. 1153 (1909).
9. Congress also revised two sections: § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), revised by 42 U.S.C. §
1985 (1958) and § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958).
10. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
The significances of the distinction between the vote in State and federal elections lies in
the fact that the federal protective power does not extend to purely private acts depriving
people of their opportunity to vote for state or local officials. See note 3 supra and CIvI
RIGHTS REPORT at 16-17.
11. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), declaring unconstitutional §§ 3, 4,
16 Stat. 140 (1870) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), declaring unconstitutional §§
1, 2, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) ; and James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903), declaring unconstitu-
tional § 5, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
12. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) ; United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v.
Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), for its discussion of this question.
13. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910
(1957) ; Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951) and not to state judicial remedies.
See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
14. Jinks v. Hodge, 11 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) (the Civil Rights Acts do
not permit class actions for damages or injunction because they grant only personal
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It should have been apparent to any Congressman contemplating the plight
of the disenfranchised Negro after the Second World War that the complex
of statutes then in effect'G provided little hope for enforcement of Negro
voting rights in the vast twelve state area commonly known as the "black
belt."'u The "black belt" is a poor agricultural expanse populated by more
Negroes than whites, where cotton and tobacco are still grown extensively on
farms owned by whites and worked by Negro sharecroppers.17 These croppers
are generally uneducated,' 8 impoverished, 19 unable to obtain legal assistance,20
under-represented on jury panels,21 and dependent upon the white landlord
for economic survival.2 2 The economically dependent Negro could not realis-
tically have been expected individually to assert and litigate his right to
register at the risk of displeasing his landlord.2 3 The requirement that all state
remedies be exhausted before the federal statutes could be invoked contri-
buted to the already prohibitive expense 2 4 of bringing a lawsuit which, in all
probability, would be futile.25 And the refusal of courts to entertain class
suits denied the disenfranchised Negroes a device which might have mitigated
some of these difficulties.20 Moreover, the federal government was limited in
its attempt to enforce the right of the Negro to the commencement of criminal
prosecutions 2 7 which, in addition to being ill suited to the widespread enforce-
rights) ; Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1945), rev'd on other grounds,
64 F.2d 924, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946); compare ReddLx v. Lucky, 252 F.2d
930 (5th Cir. 1958); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
15. The remnants of the original civil rights legislation after the Second World War
might be summarized in the following manner: 1) The section which is merely declara-
tory of rights and carries no remedy, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). This section was reenacted as
71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a) (1958) ; 2) Those sections which gave remedies
in the form of civil causes of action. 17 Stat. 13, 15 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1936 (1958) ; 3) Those sections which impose criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242
(1958) ; 4) Those sections which are procedural. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1443, (1958).
See CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT 73-75, Comment, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 619, 623-625 (1958);
KONVITz, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 65-72 (1961).
16. See CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT 143-46.
17. See id. at 146-50, 358-61.
18. See id. at 354-55.
19. See id. at 357.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 20, col. 2. Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1960,
p. 1, col. 1.
21. See Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal, 99 U.
PA. L. REv. 439, 449 (1951) ; Note, 47 COLUm. L. REV. 76, 96 (1947).
22. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 190-91.
23. See note 14 supra; PRICE, THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTrH 43-44
(1959).
24. CIVIL r IGHTs REPORT 75; Comment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 661, 665 (1958).
25. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 104-05 ("This early program was largely a failure.");
Testimony of Hon. Emanuel Celler at the Hearings on HR. 6127 Before the House Com-
mittee on Rules, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
26. See note 23 supra.
27. 18U.S.C.§§ 241,242,595 (1958).
1962]
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ment of voting rights, 28 were essentially unobtainable because the economic
situation in the area lent itself to a pattern of effective but subtle coercion
directed at maintaining the white character of the electorate,2 and because
the predominantly white juries were reluctant to return convictions.30 It is
not surprising therefore that in 1950 despite the continued maintenance of the
Reconstruction civil rights laws on the statute books of our nation, 13 of the
158 counties comprising the "black belt" had no Negroes registered, and 79
others had fewer than 10 per cent of the eligible Negroes registered. 31
In an effort to remedy these defects Congress, in 1957, passed a new Civil
Rights Act 32 which declares, inter alia, that "no person, whether acting under
color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce or attempt to
intimidate, threaten or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering
with the right of such other person to vote [in federal elections]."33 The new
statute provides further that "Whenever any person has engaged or there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or
practice which would deprive any other person [of such rights], the Attorney
General may institute . . . a civil action or other proper proceedings for
preventative relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order." 34 Actions may be brought under
the new statute without regard for exhaustion by plaintiff of administrative
or other remedies. 35
By authorizing the Attorney General to institute equitable proceedings,
Congress manifested an intent to alleviate the expenses and fear of reprisals
which traditionally accompanied private actions, to facilitate large scale pro-
ceedings affecting many potential voters, and to deny to local juries the power
to thwart broad national policy.
28. See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 152, 160; Civi. RIGHTS REPORT 228 n.18.
29. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text.
30. See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS at 126-33; Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 887, 893
(1956) ; H.R. 291, U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 1979 (1957) (letter from Attorney General
Herbert Brownell) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT] See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1961, p. 20, col. 2.
31. See CIvIL RIGHTS REPORT 143.
32. 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958). The purpose of the bill was "to
provide means of further securing and protecting... civil rights." HousE REPORT at 1966.
The constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 (a) & (c) was established in United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b) can be implied
from the statement of Mr. Justice Brewer in James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903), that
if § 5 had been limited to federal elections (as § 1971 (b) is) it would have been constitutional.
33. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1958).
34. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1958).
35. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(d) (1958).
For a discussion of these and other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 see HousE
REPORT; Comment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 661 (1958) ; Lane, The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 4
HowARD L.J. 36 (1958) ; Comment, 56 MicH. L. REv. 619 (1958).
The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86, was aimed at curing some defects in the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 and to assist in the implementation of the prior act. See CMViL RIGHTS
REPORT 76-78.
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In United States v. Beaty,36 the Attorney General invoked the 1957 act
for the first time to protect Negro voting rights against economic coercion by
private citizens. 37 The case arose in Haywood County, Tennessee,38 one of
the "black belt" counties in which no Negro had been registered to vote
since the period of Reconstruction.3" Inspired by the efforts of the newly
formed Civic and Welfare League of neighboring Fayette County to increase
Negro registration, some Haywood County Negroes initiated a similar effort. 40
The white businessman retaliated by circulating a "black list" composed of
Negroes who registered and whites who assisted them.41 All local merchants
were "induced" to boycott anyone whose name appeared on the list by denying
him credit, refusing to sell him necessities or other goods even for cash,
36. 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b). There was one other prosecution under this subsection of the
Act. After Mr. Francis Joseph Atlas of East Carroll Parish, La., had testified before the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Hearings before the United States Commission
on Civil Rights 24-27 (1961), he informed the Commission that as a result of his testimony
he was being subjected to an economic boycott. See Time Magazine, Sept. 15, 1961, p. 24.
As a result of his complaints, the Department of Justice filed a suit under § 1971(b) on his
behalf. Hearings 793-99. In February of 1961, the white defendants agreed to carry on busi-
ness with Mr. Atlas and not to "intimidate, threaten, coerce . . . the said Francis Joseph
Atlas for the purpose of interfering with the right of the said Francis Joseph Atlas to
vote.... " Stipulation in the case of United States v. Deal, reported in Hearings 799-800. The
Justice Department said the agreement was the first in an economic reprisal case. See
Birmingham News, Feb. 5, 1961, p. 31a.
38. Subsequently, an identical action was brought in adjacent Fayette County, Tennes-
see. The district court granted a temporary restraining order against landlord defendants in
the Fayette County suit and the order has been understood by the parties to be effective
pending the outcome of the Haywood County suit. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 96.
39. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 37, 284-85, 348.
40. The problem in these Western Tennessee counties started when Negroes in
Fayette County became dissatisfied with the manner of law enforcement in the county and
decided to take a hand in the primary election for sheriff held on August 1, 1959. See Ebony
Magazine, Sept. 1960, p. 30. In May of that year J. F. Estes, a Memphis attorney, organized
the Fayette County Civic and Welfare League. See Dykeman and Stokely, The Big Cure for
Segregation, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1961, p. 104 (Magazine Section). Mr. Estes
formed a similar organization in Haywood County. Ibid. There were at that time about 600
Negro voters in Fayette County. See Ebony Magazine, Sept. 1960, p. 30. On primary day,
the Negroes in Fayette County were barred from the polls. The government brought an
action under § 1971 (a) seeking to enjoin the white primary, which suit ended in a consent
decree. United States v. Fayette County Democratic Executive Committee, Civil No. 3835
(W.D. Tenn. 1959). After the white primary was outlawed in Fayette County, Negroes be-
gan registering by the hundreds. See Time Magazine, Jan. 6, 1961, p. 22. In Haywood
County, Negro efforts to register were subjected to a series of dilatory tactics. See Brief for
Appellant, pp. 5-6, United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Government Brief] ; Dykeman and Stokely, supra at 104.
41. See Government Brief, pp. 4-11. "The real fight began with signals being called by
the White Citizens Council which meets, reportedly, in the Courthouse. At a meeting there
last April, the blacklist was drawn up. A dozen Negro leaders were used as a basic list and
others were added as they registered to vote .... [It] appears, there are at least a dozen white
men being boycotted, along with about 400 Negroes." Ebony Magazine, Sept. 1960, p. 32.
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and terminating his employment.4 When Negro tenants on the sharecropping
farms also began to register,43 the white landowners countered by refusing
to renew their sharecropping contracts and evicting or dismissing registered
Negroes.44 The evicted Negroes moved into a makeshift tent city on the
farm of a Negro landowner,45 and were supplied with necessities by outside
persons and the federal government.46
The government brought suit against certain Haywood County landowners
and businessmen praying for both permanent and temporary orders enjoin-
ing the alleged acts.47 In addition, the government asked the court to order
the defendant landlords to file explanatory affidavits before they could evict
Negro sharecroppers or alter their contracts.48 After a preliminary hearing
the district court temporarily restrained thirteen businessmen defendants
from "interfering through intimidation and/or coercion in registration ....- 49
42. See complaint reported in Appendix to Government Brief, pp. 7a-8a, United States v.
Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
43. See Ebony Magazine, Sept. 1960, pp. 30-32; Dykeman and Stokely, .upra note 40 at
109.
44. When the cotton harvest ended, the sharecroppers who had registered were ordered
to move on. Time Magazine, Jan. 6, 1961, p. 22. Many of these sharecroppers issued affidavits
as to the reason for their eviction. See Appendix to Government Brief, pp. 25a-100a, United
States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
45. The evicted Negroes moved not out of the county, but onto property owned by
a Negro landowner, Shepherd Towles. Time Magazine, Jan. 6, 1961, p. 22. Immediate
tension began to mount with the erection of this tent city, dubbed "Freedom Village" by
its sponsors and "a publicity stunt to attract sympathy for the Negroes" by its opponents.
See Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1961, § 1, p. 4 .
46. Many outside persons and organizations contributed to the support of the Negroes
in the tent city. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1960, pp. 1, 5; Shreveport Times, Jan. 14, 1961,
editorial; Detroit News, Feb. 5, 1961, § A, p. 6 (five University of Michigan students went
to the tent city in order to distribute food and were asked to leave the county by the sheriff).
47. On September 13, 1960, the Department of Justice brought an action under § 1971(b)
against 29 white persons in Haywood County. This was increased to 65 by amendment on
November 18, 1960. On December 14, 1960, a second suit on the same grounds was filed in
Fayette County. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1960, p. 34m ("If the Justice Department
can win this injunction and make it stick, it will have opened up a new avenue in the long
struggle to bring voting equality to the Negro citizen. One of the cruelest and most effective
weapons used to deprive him of his rights has been the economic weapon, against which he
has been powerless to defend himself unaided."); Baltimore Afro-American, Sept. 20,
1960, p. 4 ("The law suit filed, last week, by the U.S. Attorney General ... could be the most
significant move by the Federal Government since the Supreme Court's desegregation ruling,
May 17, 1954") ; compare Shreveport Times, January 14, 1961 ("So, here we find a federal
court raising the issue that a man who has been in a sharecropping agreement with another
man in the past must continue that sharecropping agreement indefinitely-perhaps forever-
because at some time or other he expressed the view that he wouldn't have Negro voters as
his partners in crop production.").
48. See Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 7, United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief].
49. The opinion is not reported. See copy in Appendix to Government Brief, pp. 395a-
400a, United States v. Beaty, supra note 48; Reply Brief, pp. 2-3; cf. Shreveport Times, supra
note 47.
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But it refused to enjoin the landowners from evicting registered Negroes, rea-
soning that the Civil Rights Act did not vest it "with authority to adjudge con-
tracts and property rights."50 It, therefore, denied all government prayers
"relative to the eviction of tenants," including the request for affidavits. 51 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit extended the restraining order to apply to the
landlords 52 but affirmed the district court's denial of the request for affidavits,
because "the request would assume that the defendant did violate the law
and place upon him the burden to prove that he did not."53
The circuit court's construction of the 1957 act to apply to economic
coercion in general and to economic coercion involving contract and property
rights in particular seems correct. In requesting legislation to protect voting
rights, President Eisenhower noted: "It is disturbing that in some localities
allegations persist that Negro citizens are being deprived of their right to
vote and are likewise being subjected to unwarranted economic pressures."54
Senator Douglas, a sponsor of the bill, asserted that the legislation was direct-
ed at denials of voting rights "by economic pressure" as well as by other
means. 5 And Representative Celler, a House sponsor, indicated that if "the
milk dealer, the coal dealer, the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker
... agree.., to boycott" persons who try to vote, the agreement would violate
the proposed law. 0 Since economic coercion may be accomplished by the
improper exercise of contract and property rights as well as by refusals to
sell, and since Congress apparently recognized this obvious fact, the district
court had no ground, in the absence of a specific statutory exclusion, for
creating a verbal distinction which could effectively defeat the manifest pur-
pose behind the legislation.
Both courts were correct in holding that the 1957 act permitted the granting
of preliminary orders temporarily restraining interferences with voting rights,57
since the statute specifically empowers the district court to grant "preventative
relief" including temporary restraining orders.5 8 And they were correct in
holding that the facts of this case demanded such relief. If during the course
50. See Appendix to Government Brief, p. 398a, United States v. Beaty, 288 F2d 653
(6th Cir. 1961).
51. Id. at 399a.
52. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1961).
53. Id. at 656-57.
54. "State of the Union Message," sent to Congress January 5, 1956, reprinted in
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4657, 4668 (1956).
55. 103 CONG. REc. 10988 (1957).
Instances of economic coercion were incorporated into the record by several Congress-
men. See, e.g., 103 CONG. Rzc. 12793-97 (1957) (". . . many landlords reportedly have
warned their Negro tenants that if they registered they would be fired.") ; id. at A1741;
id. at 12902-03.
56. Hearings 45. The words are from the question by Chairman Smith to witness Celler
during an extended colloquy between the two. See generally id. at 41-46.
57. See notes 49 & 52 supra.
58. 42U.S.C.§ 1971(c) (1958).
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of the litigation defendants could force the Negroes to choose between voting
and their livelihood, the injury resulting from either course would probably
be irreparable, because even a successful trial could not restore the right to
vote in a past election nor could it return the enjoyment of past necessities
which probably have been foregone. Moreover, a preliminary injunction would
alleviate some of the disruptive effects of the suit; unlawful dismissals would
not occur at least during the litigation, and fewer dismissals of sharecropper
replacements 59 would thus be necessary if and when the government pre-
vailed.
In the trial "on the merits" which will now be conducted,60 the district court
will be asked permanently to enjoin businessmen and landlords from condi-
tioning economic transaction upon the voting status of the customer, employee
or tenant.61 Although at common law a businessman or a landowner had the
privilege of refusing to deal with a particular person for any reason, 2 cases
upholding the right of the federal government to proscribe certain anticom-
petitive refusals to deal, 63 and to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship in
order to effectuate a national purpose 64 indicate that Congress has the power
to qualify these common law privileges. And since Congress has, by statute, 0
59. See note 71 infra.
60. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 96.
61. See Reply Brief, p. 7.
62. See Note, 45 ILL. L. REv. 784, 785 (1951) ; Hamilton, Property Rights in the
Market, 1 J. LEG. & POL. SOCIOL. 10 (1931).
63. These Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 4 (1958) cases involve the problem of a
seller trying to enforce a policy of resale price maintenance by refusing to deal with price
cutters. See NEALE, THE AXTI-TRusT LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 340-45 (1960). The problem
was stirred up when Mr. Justice McReynolds decided a case on a procedural point, but
went on to say, by way of dictum, that "in the absence of any purpose to create or main-
tain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919). Even here, however, it is to be noted that Mr. Justice McReynolds stated
that this right was not unqualified.
The effect of this observation was whittled down in a series of subsequent decisions.
United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) ; Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 722 (1944) ; United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). This last case may have overruled Colgate al-
together. See id. at 49 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.) and ibid. (dissenting opinion of
Harlan, J.).
64. See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 352-71 (1950). Under this form of legislation the
federal government, the states, and the municipalities have been able to regulate the land-
lord tenant relationship. When a tenant remains in possession after the expiration of the
original relationship, for example, the ensuing tenancy is termed a "statutory tenancy" and
its duties and obligations are governed by the prior leasing contract. Id. at 371. The con-
stitutionality of this rent control legislation was upheld in Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944). See also Willis, A Short History of Rent Control Laws. 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 54 (1950) ; Weiss, Good Faith and Eviction Control, 60 YALE L.J. 600 (1951).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1958).
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declared interference with voting rights to be an illegal reason for refusing to
deal, 60 the district court is clearly empowered permanently to enjoin both the
businessman and the landowner from employing such coercion.
Since many individuals may be adversely affected in a variety of ways by
these requested permanent orders, it may be argued that the district court
should decline to exercise its power to grant such equitable relief.67 An order
requiring businessmen to treat Negroes who had registered in the same
fashion as Negroes who had not registered would certainly engender some
hostility. But since the boycott apparently has been imposed upon some
businessmen involuntarily, and since it has been costly to all the local business-
men, 5 the reactions accompanying a federal order enjoining the continuation
of the boycott would probably not be unmixed. The assessment of money
damages, the only real alternative device which could be employed in lieu of
an injunction, would provide less than adequate relief. In a suit for damages,
the plaintiff must show specific economic injury,69 whereas in a suit for in-
junction plaintiffs need only prove that the actions of defendants interfered
with voting rights. Moreover, even if substantial money damages were
assessed by the local jury, more hostility might be engendered than if an
injunction were ordered, for the damages would likely be assessed against
the very businessmen who were incurring losses as a result of the boycott. A
permanent order enjoining the local businessmen from boycotting registered
Negroes would therefore best effectuate the enforcement of Negro voting
rights at the least social cost.
But since in a rural setting landlord-tenant and employer-cropper relations
are far more intimate than the relatively impersonal seller-buyer relation,
permanent relief requiring reinstatement of Negro tenants or employees evict-
ed or dismissed for attempting to register raises more serious problems than
the requirement of selling without regard to registration status. A court
order compelling landlords or employers to take back old tenants or employees,
in addition to requiring two groups to work or live together in an atmosphere
of belligerence, may harm innocent third parties; for the order would result
in the eviction or dismissal of any sharecroppers who replaced the previously
evicted Negroes.70 But if these replacements knew that they were being
hired to thwart the efforts of others to vote, their claim of injury carries less
weight. Indeed, the fact that the federal government had instituted proceed-
ings and that the evicted or dismissed Negroes were encamped in a nearby
66. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
67. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941).
68. See Ebony Magazine, Sept. 1960, pp. 27-30. See note 72 infra.
69. Otherwise the successful plaintiff will only receive nominal damages.
70. But the labor cases have held that the fact that reinstatement might mean dis-
missal of replacements is no excuse for not reinstating. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pecheur
Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130
F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
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"tent city" anticipating return to their farms, should have caused the re-
placements to anticipate a tenure of uncertain duration.
Balanced against these costs, there are important advantages to be obtained
by ordering reinstatement. Most important, reinstatement is necessary if
Negro tenants or employees unlawfully evicted or dismissed are to be made
whole.71 Reinstatement, moreover, may deter landlords or employers from
similar wholesale evictions and dismissals in the future, because unlike the
outcomes of successful criminal or damage actions, the violator cannot rid
himself of those unlawfully dismissed at any price.72 The threat of reinstate-
ment would also tend to reduce the incidence of economic pressures being un-
lawfully exerted upon reluctant landlords and businessmen to evict or dismiss
Negro registrants."
However appropriate reinstatement may appear in response to the allegedly
unlawful evictions or dismissals in Beaty, courts of equity have traditionally
been reluctant to order this remedy. 4 Some courts have characterized the
landlord-sharecropper relationship as that of landlord and tenant ;73 since the
71. It is clear that without reinstatement the Negro will suffer severe disruption because
of his attempt to vote. "The victims themselves are profoundly injured by the expense and
inconvenience of moving-if they can find new farms. Their children's schooling is dis-
rupted. Even those who remain are being irreparably injured because they are deprived of
their federal statutory right to be free from attempts to intimidate them." Reply Brief at 9.
72. A successful action in Haywood County may deter landholders in other counties
from similar conduct. A farmer who illegally evicts his croppers will suffer the disruption
of getting a new tenant, the expense of a protracted law suit, and, after losing the trial on
the merits, an injunction commanding reinstatement. The net effect will be greatly to dis-
turb the economy of the county, and businessmen and farmers of these not too prosperous
"black belt" counties may be hesitant to make a similar attack on Negro voting when in
all probability their efforts will only achieve a bitter and expensive return to the status
quo ante.
73. It was reported that when many of the white landlords asked their tenants to move
on, they stated that they had to do this because of pressure on them. See, e.g., Appendi:x to
Government Brief, pp. 30a-31a, United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961) ("Mr.
Gillespie said he wished he had had a chance to talk to me. He said, 'You know if the white
people up town tell me I got something on my place that isn't right, I will know what it
is, and if the white say I have, I will sow my farm down in Bermuda grass and move to
town.' ").
74. The early common law had an expansive view of freedom of contract, and because
of arguments like lack of mutuality of remedy in a personal service contract, it refused to
grant specific performance for employment contracts. See, e.g., Union Labor Hospital
Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554, 112 Pac. 886 (1910) ("Precisely as
may the employee cease labor at his whim or pleasure, and, whatever be his reason, good,
bad, or indifferent.., so, upon the other hand, may the employer discharge, and, whatever
be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent, no one has suffered a legal wrong.") ; Lambert v.
Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 624, 183 S.E. 790 (1936) ; 5 CoRBix, CONTRACTS § 1204 (1951).
75. The difference between the two is verbal: if the landlord receives his share of the
crop as rent, then there is a landlord-tenant relation; but if the share of the produce the
cropper keeps is considered salary, then there is an employer-employee relation. Im-
portant legal consequences, however, flow from this characterization. See 1 TIFFAxY, REAL
PROPERTY § 78 (3d ed. 1939).
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tenant has an interest in land which is considered inherently unique, his
remedy at law will usually be inadequate; 76 he may therefore obtain in-
junctive relief for possession.77 But other courts have labeled the relationship
one of employer and employee; and at common law, either could terminate an
employment contract at will, risking only an action for damages. 78 Even
if this view of the relation is accepted, Congress has the power to alter com-
mon law doctrine.70 The Supreme Court has, for example, upheld the Wagner
Act section which provides for reinstatement of employees whose dismissal
constituted an unfair labor practice.8 0 The Court has upheld reinstatement
76. See 4 POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
77. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bowlin, 11 Okla. 299 (1925); cf. Kelley v. Moody, 176
Ga. 138, 167 S.E. 10 (1932).
78. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Cook, 76 Ga. 24 (1885).
79. This was not always so certain. The State and Federal legislatures were rebuffed
when they first attempted to change the common law. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co.
v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 300, 76 Pac. 848 (1904) ("Any act of the legislature that would under-
take to impose on an employer the obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any
reason, he should not desire would be a denial of his constitutional right to make and
terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property") ; State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreuetz-
berg, 114 Wisc. 530, 545, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902).
When Congress attempted to make it a crime to discharge employees because of their
activities in labor organizations, the Supreme Court held that any legislation that disturbs
the equality of employees' and employers' right to contract was an arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract "which no government can legally justify in a free land." Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908). The Court, however, did recognize the fact that
there might be some restriction on freedom of contract when it said, "Such liberty and right
embrace the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of others ... subject to
the fundamental condition that no contract, whatever its subject matter, can be sustained
which the law, upon reasonable grounds, forbids as inconsistent with the public interests,
or as hurtful to the public order, or as detrimental to the common good." Id. at 172. A
condition in an employment contract that the employee not join a union was not a condition
that the legislature could forbid in order to protect the common good. Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1915).
For the modern renunciation of this position see note 80 infra.
80. When the Wagner Act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937), the power of the employer to fire an employee for joining a union was
restricted. Section 10(c) of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958), provides for the
reinstatement of an employee who was discharged from his employment because of union
affiliation. There is no elaborate background to the notion of job reinstatement. It is a
common sense device that had formerly been used by the old Labor Board under P.R. 44.
See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1941).
Once recognizing the right of the legislature to grant reinstatement, the courts have
been vigilant in protecting it. It has been held that this right can not even be contracted
away by the employee. NLRB v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 113 F.2d 232 (9th
Cir. 1940) ; Waterman S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941).
Moreover, statutes have been upheld which have restricted the right of the employer to
fine an employee for participating in activities unrelated to employment. In Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 28 Cal2d 481, 171 P2d 21 (1946),
an employer had allegedly wrongfully discharged an employee because of his political
activities. The employer challenged the constitutionality of the statute, § 1101 of the
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orders, even in the absence of a specific statutory provision, when necessary to
effectuate the purpose of a labor statute."' And at least two courts have order-
ed reinstatement to further "public policy" expressed in statutes unrelated to
labor regulation.82 Since the 1957 Civil Rights Act was aimed at economic
coercion, and since reinstatement would most effectively further the "public
policy" embodied in the act, this rationale seems particularly appropriate to
the situation in Beaty.
The government's request that defendants be ordered to file sworn state-
CAL. LABOR CODE, which forbade employers from interfering in the political activities of
their employees. The court upheld the restriction on the employers' right to discharge.
Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard Inc., 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949),
involved an employee who was discharged from employment because he absented him-
self from his job to serve as an election official in accordance with § 695 of the CAL. ELEC-
TION CODE. In finding for Mr. Kouff the court said: "Granting that under the general law
an employee at will may be discharged without any cause, this particular statute interposes
an exception to that rule, the basis of which is the necessity of drawing on industry for
such temporary public servants as election officers." Id. at 325. Compare Mallard v.
Boring, 46 L.R.R.M. 2862 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) where the court held there was no
statute protecting the right to be a juror.
81. Railway Labor Act. Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930). See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941) ("Therefore,
if § 10(c) had empowered the Board to 'take such affirmative action as will effectuate the
policies of this Act,' the right to restore to a man employment which was wrongfully denied
him could hardly be doubted.").
82. Petermann v. Local 396, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 44 L.R.R.M. 2968 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959), 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 24 (1959), involved a union business
agent, employed on a contract terminable at will, who was fired allegedly for refusing to
commit perjury before a state legislative hearing. The commission of perjury and the solicita-
tion of the commission of perjury are crimes. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118, 653(f). The court
held for the agent.
The threat of criminal prosecution would ... be a sufficient deterrent .... However,
in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil
law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an
employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the
dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. . . . To hold that one's
continued employment could be made contingent upon his commission of a felonious
act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct ... and
would serve to contaminate the honest administration of public affairs."
Id. at 2969-70. The case is noted in 14 VAND. L. REv. 397 (1960) ; 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 624
(1960).
The other case, Bussell v. Bishop, 152 Ga. 428, 110 S.E. 174 (1921), involved a landlord
who frightened a cropper off of the farm in mid-season. The court permitted the cropper to
return to gather the crops.
While the solvent landlord may not be enjoined from breaching his contract with
his cropper, and from entering into and taking possession of the crop, though
wrongfully, the solvent landlord has no ... right to compel the cropper to abandon
his crop .... [T]he judge was authorized . . . to issue an injunction against the
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ments of the reasons for subsequent evictions, dismissals, or contract adjust-
ments "involving any Negro of voting age in Haywood County" was rejected
by both courts.8 3 The Sixth Circuit's objection that this procedure presumes
violation, placing an unfair burden of proof on defendants,8 4 is unconvincing
because all preliminary orders assume temporarily that the defendants are behav-
ing unlawfully ;8 and while the affidavits may require the defendant to come
forward with some explanation for his action, the burden or proof in any sub-
sequent contempt proceedings remains with the government. Nevertheless,
the government's request that defendants affirmatively set forth the reasons
for taking action against Negroes, may have gone too far. The government
has no legitimate interest, under the statute, in discovering why a given
Negro was evicted, except to determine whether or not the eviction was re-
lated to voting rights. But the requested affidavit would enable the govern-
ment to commence perjury or contempt I6 proceedings against a defendant
who, for example, had sworn that he evicted a tenant because of laziness when
the eviction was in fact based on a desire to mechanize. This defect could
be remedied simply by requiring, as a condition to eviction of any voting
age Negro, an affidavit stating that the tenant's voting status played no part
in the decision to dismiss.
The government's objective in requesting the affidavits may have been the
notice it would receive of contemplated actions concerning voting age
Negroes ;87 such notice would afford the government an opportunity to investi-
gate the circumstances and oppose the action if it were actually an attempt to
interfere with voting rights. Although even absent the affidavits, subsequent
contempt proceedings could be employed to punish landowners who evicted
registered Negroes for disengenuous reasons,8 8 conditioning eviction upon
83. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 657 (6th Cir. 1961).
84. Ibid.
85. They do so at least in the sense that they prohibit certain of the defendant's
activities. See POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1359-1359a (5th ed. 1941).
86. The use of injunctive relief brings into play the contempt power of the federal court
to protect its decrees. See Comment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 661 (1958) ; cf. Comment, 65 YALE
L.J. 630 (1956).
87. Alternatively, it might just be an attempt to gain information. Because the very
same actions that the government sought to obtain civil relief also give rise to criminal
prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 594 (1958), the government's efforts in obtaining full information
from both sides were hindered. The white defendants refused to answer most of the govern-
ment's questions during the district court hearings on the grounds that any answer that
they might give might tend to incriminate them. See generally Appendix to Government
Brief, pp. 290a-292a, 304a-305a, 312a-314a, 319a-320a, 325a-327a, 332a-335a, 401a-425a,
United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961). It would seem both fairer to the
defendants in such a civil action and a possible assistance in government fact finding if an
amendment were added to 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1958) to the effect that by bringing a
civil action the government precluded itself from bringing a criminal action on the same
set of facts.
88. The court thought this would be a sufficient deterrent. United States v. Beaty, 286
F.2d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
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the submission of an affidavit (or some other reliable method of notification)
may be the only effective "preventative relief" the court could grant to assure
that no coercion was employed. An affidavit stating that voting status played
no part in the decision would certainly suffice for this purpose.
If adequate care is given to fashioning both temporary and permanent
orders, the 1957 Civil Rights Act seems adequate to combat blatant instances
of economic coercion such as those alleged in Beaty. But where the violations
are less obvious, the government may have difficulty in proving intent to
interfere with voting rights; since Negroes are typically at the bottom of the
economic ladder, there are frequently credible business reasons for severing
economic relations with some of them.89 Widespread use of the 1957 act
is certain to engender increased animosity between all the parties affected.
While such an atmosphere may be a necessary cost of securing Negro voting
rights, it indicates that ultimate solution to the problem cannot be achieved by
legal means alone; those institutions which influence social attitudes have
also to play a crucial role.90
89. See Baltimore Afro-American, Sept. 20, 1960, p. 4.
90. CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT at 197; Time Magazine, Sept. 15, 1961, p. 25; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 1960, p. 34m.
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